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Foreword 
In the past year immigration and asylum, multiculturalism and race 
relations have been high up the political agenda in Germany and the UK. 
Both countries are home to a diverse range of ethnic communities, 
religions, cultures and languages. These communities enrich our societies 
and are a source of strength and innovation. But multiculturalism also 
presents challenges.  How do we give people the rights and status they 
require to integrate into society, while maintaining social cohesion? How 
can we ensure our institutions do not discriminate against minority ethnic 
groups? How should our societies combat the fears and anxieties amongst 
our i ndigenous populations about levels of immigration? What does it 
mean to be British or German?  
The UK and Germany have traditionally taken different approaches to 
meeting these challenges. But it is important for us to co-operate 
increasingly closely, both bilaterally and within the EU. These issues have 
become all the more pertinent, in the light both of EU enlargement, which 
will extend freedom of movement to hundreds of thousands more people; 
and of d emographic change throughout the EU, which is leading to 
increasing willingness on the part of governments to open up their labour 
markets to immigrants.  
The British Embassy Berlin and the Center for European Integration, 
Bonn (ZEI) addressed these questions at a seminar held in Berlin on  1 
December 2000. We focused particularly on what governments can and 
should do to combat racism and promote integration; on the lessons the 
UK and Germany can learn from one another; and on the role of the 
European Union and the impact of increasing numbers of ethnic 
minorities and foreigners in the EU on European identity. 
The contributions to this seminar are reproduced here, with the aim of 
contributing to a deeper debate, of vital importance to Europe's future.  
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Sir Paul Lever 
Opening Remarks 
Traditional British Diplomacy has changed since my first posting to 
Helsinki in 1967. With the advent of the internet, e -mail and cheap 
international telephone calls, our role as information gatherers and 
reporters of events has diminished. We cannot hope to compete with 
Reuters, dpa or the Financial Times. Given the frequent face-to-face and 
telephone contacts between Ministers and senior officials, the function of 
mediators between governments is also no longer our exclusive preserve. 
Increasingly British diplomacy in a country like Germany is about public 
diplomacy. About presenting an up to date image of Britain to the German 
public; and about exploring jointly themes of common interest.   
The new Embassy building was built precisely for that purpose. To be a 
showcase of modern British art and design and to provide us with the 
facilities for seminars, exhibitions and receptions. Its innovative design 
has a lready aroused considerable interest amongst the Berliners, who 
quickly nicknamed i t "das bunte Haus" - the multi-coloured house. Over 
7,000 of them came to our first open day in November 2000. The 
Conference on “Multiculturalism and Ethnic Minorities” on December 1, 
2000, was the first conference of its kind that we have organised there.  
In the EU, diplomacy is about comparing experiences, exchanging best 
practice and learning from one another. That was what we wanted to do 
with this conference. The approaches in the UK and Germany towards 
multiculturalism are not identical. It would be odd if they were, given our 
different histories and socio-political backgrounds. Even the vocabulary 
we use is different. In November 2000 Tony Blair gave a speech in which 
he said that “Britain's multicultural identity has become one of this Sir Paul Lever 
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country's greatest resources”. Not many German politicians would speak 
in this way. The word multicultural/multikulturell does not have the same 
positive connotations for many Germans. And the concept of integration is 
interpreted somewhat differently in our two countries.  
Germany and Britain also have much in common. We are both liberal 
democracies. We both want our societies to be fair societies, where every 
individual is given an equal chance to fulfil their potential, whatever their 
ethnic or cultural background.  
The purpose of the conference was not to prescribe solutions which may 
work well in one society, but not in the other. It was to discuss common 
challenges; compare experiences -good and bad; and to have a productive 
and fertile exchange of ideas in dialogue with many distinguished 
practitioners.   
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Ludger Kühnhardt 
Introduction 
I should like to express my sincere thanks to Paul Lever for allowing the 
Center for European Integration Studies (ZEI) to co-organise this 
conference in the unique new British Embassy building in Berlin. We 
appreciate this honour. Perhaps it is attributable to the ZEI's role as a 
cutting-edge research institute (and a recent addition to the academic set-
up in Bonn), conducting practice-oriented, truly European research 
throughout Europe.  
The aim of our seminar was to make comparisons - to provide us with a 
better understanding of the questions which are being asked on both sides 
of the English Channel about the situation and status of ethnic and 
cultural minorities, issues that touch all Europeans. We also wanted to 
find out whether and to what extent different responses from Britons and 
Germans might stimulate new ideas. 
Another of the key objectives of the seminar was to draw attention to the 
European dimension of this issue. Europe is by nature both multicultural 
and polycultural. The more we relate our national discussions to the 
general challenges facing our continent, the more it will become apparent 
how complex this subject is. Europe is discussing its identity, is moving 
towards a constitutional order, and has agreed, as a first step, the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights in the European Union. Article 22 of the 
draft Charter states quite rightly that, “The Union respects the diversity of 
cultures, religions and languages”.  
But of  what use is even the most well intended anti-discrimination 
initiative so long as the Charter of Basic Rights has not been incorporated 
into the European Treaties and is not enforceable by law in the European Ludger Kühnhardt 
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Union? The German and British governments and the governments of all 
other EU member states still have a lot of work to do if they want to avoid 
getting bogged down in empty declarations. 
Summit results are one thing, real life another. Real life demands, at least 
as far as the Charter is concerned, decisive improvements to the 
agreements reached at the EU summit in Nice in December 2000 and, as 
a r esult, an increase in real political integration in Europe. Moreover, 
Europe will only make real progress once we have succeeded in 
developing a common asylum and immigration policy, with decisions 
taken by qualified majority voting. Consistent application of the principle 
of qualified majority voting is the most important step towards European 
integration, if the EU is to avoid becoming a self-paralysing institution, 
discriminating against the smaller European states.  
In the final analysis, identity and culture are essentially political and 
constitutional questions. By adopting a political and constitutional 
approach, we can set standards for social cohesion, which both give a 
firm b asis for the randomness of intellectual discussion and the 
overheated nature of some political debates, and also provide direction 
for disagreements about interpretation. The aim of integrating foreigners, 
of tolerant dealings with ethnic and cultural minorities and of making full 
use of all opportunities for cultural encounters and inspiration, should be 
of benefit to Europe. Thus the questions discussed at the seminar were not 
limited to identities, but also embraced politics; we  did not just look at 
social questions, but also at the reasons for the concerns of a frightened 
and a pprehensive public. We covered more than just British pragmatism 
and the German preference for theoretical principle. We were discussing 
a big and important European issue. 
British-German dialogue is invariably characterised by an invigorating 
and thorough airing of views. A while ago, Oxford historian Timothy 
Garton Ash said he thought it strange that the English say “what on earth 
is the matter?”, whereas the Germans express the same frustration using 
the word heaven (“was um Himmels willen ist hier los?”). Is German 
thinking about multiculturalism also afraid of departing the realm of Introduction 
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speculative theory for reality? Incidentally, this applies to all spheres of 
thought, which sometimes interconnect more easily with the German 
approach of virtual discussion, than with the British pragmatic approach 
to everyday questions. Perhaps this difference is merely semantic. Just 
think of another great word: federalism. Most Germans are intuitively 
warmed by it. The word has a positive connotation, linked to cultural 
diversity; a variety of traditions; and division of powers. 
The British jump as soon as they hear the word “federal”. They think of 
centralisation, loss of  identity, an accumulation of power at the top - in 
short, a European super-state. Could it be that multiculturalism conjures 
up the opposite for them? Do the British simply associate with this word 
the reality of living together with people from other continents and 
cultural backgrounds? This is, after all, as natural for an old imperial 
tradition, as all the other idiosyncratic kindnesses and eccentricities in the 
British - and only in the British - culture.  
Conversely, is it not so that the mere mention of the phrase multicultural 
society opens up to us Germans visions of heaven and hell? As we argue 
for and against, we soon end up with a theoretical analysis of the subject 
which only leaves space for ideological principles. We experienced just 
such an exercise in Germany in Autumn 2000. 
The seminar in Berlin was an opportunity for us to give a European 
dimension to the debate about immigration and integration; to learn from 
each other and, in the light of developments within Europe, to talk about 
the sources of strength and renewal which are what cultural diversity is 
all  about; and also to discuss the causes for the fear of the other; and 
beyond this, how to overcome xenophobia and racial discrimination for 
the benefit of Europe. Germans and Britons are p redestined to create 
common ground out of their differences. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, a 
contemporary of Goethe and fan of German Romanticism, knew this. He 
deliberated on ways to incorporate the German prefixes “ver”and “zer” 
into the English language. “Why not verboil, zerboil, verrend, zerrend? I 
want the words verflossen, zerflossen, naturalised. As I look, my soul 
feels creative throes. And now all joy, all sense zerflows”.  Ludger Kühnhardt 
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With this in mind, our thoughts flowed and "zerflowed". They flowed 
together.  
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BARONESS SCOTLAND 
Creating a Multicultural Europe:  
the British approach  
Multiculturalism is an issue of direct concern to all our citizens and vital 
to the stability of all our societies. The great diversity of cultures within 
the EU has enriched our countries immeasurably. But it also presents 
significant challenges. To ensure that there is no discrimination against 
our citizens on race and faith grounds. And to afford the same 
opportunities to all.  
Celebrating diversity 
Policy making and co-operation w ithin the EU today is about learning 
from each other's experiences and helping to solve each other's problems. 
The interpretation of the problem or its solution will not be the same in 
every country. But that does not mean that we cannot learn from each 
other's experiences - both our successes and our failures. 
The purpose of this seminar is to encourage a robust exchange of opinion. 
There are no clear-cut answers. There is no monolithic British view about 
multiculturalism, though the word is not as controversial in Britain as it is 
in Germany. But our government's policies are clear. We see strength and 
enrichment in diversity. And we believe that one of our greatest 
responsibilities is to try to make Britain a fairer place; a place where 
people of every race and religion feel themselves to be an equal part of 
the whole; a society which makes a celebration out of the fact that we are 
multi-cultural, multi-religious and multi-racial; one which not just 
assimilates people but celebrates people’s differences.  Baroness Scotland 
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The multicultural nature of UK society is one of the first things that hits 
you when you arrive in the UK. Switch on the television and you will see 
people from our minority communities, newsreaders, political 
commentators and writers; comedians, soap opera stars and opera 
singers; fashion designers and models, footballers and dancers. Watch 
any arts programme and you will find that much of contemporary British 
culture is a hybrid, born of the talents and creativity of many different 
groups - White, Black, Asian and other minorities.  
The result is a unique proof of how diversity enriches. To give one topical 
example. This week's Turner Prize  - the UK's premier award for 
contemporary artists  - had entries from Dutch and Japanese artists. And 
the winner, as y ou may know, was Wolfgang Tillmans, a German. In 
responding to criticism that the prize was being awarded to "foreigners", 
Nicholas Serota, the Tate Museum's director said that far from being bad 
news, he found it a compliment that so many artists saw London as a 
leading global art centre. 
Germany's approach to multiculturalism is different from ours. You tend 
to focus more on integration in the sense of assimilation, and the 
preservation of German identity. It would be strange if our perspectives 
were identical. We have, after all, different histories and geographies. 
Britain’s History of Immigration 
British society has been deeply marked by its island status, its long 
tradition as a nation state; its faith in its national institutions and its 
history of empire. Britain has always been a mongrel nation - by 1066, 
when we were invaded for the last time by the Normans, we had already 
been subject to invasion and settlement by the Romans, Danes, Vikings, 
Angles and Saxons. By the 16th Century there were already black africans 
living in the UK, and appearing in paintings of the time.  
In more recent times, after the last war, we encouraged immigration to 
Britain from our colonies and former colonies to help rebuild our 
shattered economy. The first group of 492 Jamaicans arrived at Tilbury Creating a Multicultural Europe: the British approach 
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Docks on the Empire Windrush in 1948. Tens of thousands more followed, 
from the Caribbean, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The 70s and 80s 
also saw the arrival of the Hong Kong Chinese and refugees from 
Vietnam.  
As a result of o ur history of immigration, more than 3 million British 
people are from visible ethnic minorities  - that is 5.5% of the total 
population. This does not include those of Irish, Jewish or Cypriot descent 
- all groups which add further to the ethnic diversity  of the British 
population. The largest minority ethnic groups are Indian, Black 
Caribbean and Pakistani.  
Most of these are British citizens with British passports. Some have 
passports of another country as well, since we allow dual nationality. In 
contrast to Germany, this is an uncontroversial concept. We believe it is 
easier for people to feel an integrated part of society if they are 
encouraged to retain their connections with their cultural roots.  
Of course, since nearly half of Britain's minority ethnic population was 
born in the UK, many now identify with a variety of cultures. More and 
more people choose multiple identities. They call themselves Black-British 
or British Indian. Or Glaswegian Muslim or Welsh Jew. We’ve got a 
plethora of descriptions. 
‘Being British’ 
Recently there has been much public debate in the UK about what it 
means to be British. It is clear that the term embraces different things for 
different people. For some it is a narrow term suggesting white, English 
and Empire  - thus excluding millions of UK citizens. For others, it 
conveys a much wider range of images reflecting the whole of our society 
- not just fish and chips, but also Chicken Tandoori and Sweet and Sour 
pork. Curry, you might be interested to know, is the UK's most popular 
restaurant food, and the industry is larger than the coal, iron and steel 
industries combined! There have been no impediments imposed on our 
minorities. And this is only to our benefit.  Baroness Scotland 
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In a multicultural society we should remember two key points. Firstly, the 
term "British" is not a static one. As one commentator has pointed out, it 
cannot be preserved like a piece of antique furniture. It must take account 
of the changes in our society over the last thirty years, including 
devolution, globalisation, the end of Empire and Britain's much closer 
involvement in Europe. It needs to include all our citizens. 
Secondly, underpinning the word must be a shared understanding of core 
British values such as respect for human rights, tolerance, fair play, and 
an outward looking approach to the world. This is essential for a cohesive 
and stable society. In general there are few conflicts between sharing 
these values and accepting cultural differences such as turbans, 
headscarves or dreadlocks. But it would be wrong to deny that there are 
some difficult issues.  
Forced Marriages 
One which is of interest to me in my job at the Foreign Office is that of 
forced marriages. A forced marriage is not the same as an arranged 
marriage. Arranged marriages are a successful and traditional method of 
parents taking a leading role in the future of their children. In an 
arranged marriage the consent of both parties is sought and given. In a 
forced marriage consent is not given.  
Every year our diplomatic posts see over a hundred cases of British 
nationals forced to marry abroad against their will. Some of the victims 
are held against their will by their own family and violated in other ways. 
All have had their human rights abused and their freedom stolen.  
The government is taking action to help victims of forced marriage. This 
has an overseas dimension and the Foreign Office, together with the 
Home Office, is taking action. The aim is to help young people whose 
fundamental rights are at risk; not to create more restrictive immigration 
rules. Creating a Multicultural Europe: the British approach 
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The British government is devoting a lot of time and effort in other areas 
towards achieving good race relations, building on and developing 
existing anti-discrimination legislation and equal o pportunities 
programmes.  
We have made progress, but we have some way to go. People from ethnic 
minorities in Britain are still not sufficiently represented in public life, 
though we are trying hard to increase their participation in parliament, 
the civil service and other government bodies. They tend to be on lower 
incomes and live in poorer housing than those from majority ethnic 
groups. The unemployment rate for ethnic minorities is higher. The 
combination of these factors is also connected to higher rates of ill health.  
Stephen Lawrence Inquiry 
Equally worrying is the suggestion in a recent report that there is growing 
evidence that Black and Irish people are treated differentially at all stages 
of the criminal justice process and are disproportionately likely to be 
imprisoned. This issue has been highlighted in the UK as the result of the 
Stephen Lawrence inquiry.  
Stephen Lawrence was a black youth stabbed to death by a group of white 
youths while waiting for a bus with a friend in April 1993. No one has 
been convicted of the crime, though the identity of the attackers is known.  
On coming into power in 1997 the Labour Government established an 
inquiry into Stephen's death. It was heavily critical of the Metropolitan 
Police Force's performance. The inquiry talked of institutional racism 
within the police f orce. By this they meant "the collective failure of the 
police to provide an appropriate and professional service to people 
because of their colour, culture or ethnic minority." 
The process of the inquiry itself was key in terms of opening people’s eyes 
- particularly the eyes of the white majority population - to what it feels 
like in Britain to be entirely law-abiding and black or Asian.  Baroness Scotland 
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The Government is determined to ensure that the recommendations of the 
Lawrence Report and the wider aspiration of achieving racial equality in 
our society are driven through.  
Of particular importance was the recommendation that the government 
should strengthen race relations legislation and ensure that the full force 
of that legislation should apply to the police. I am delighted to say that 
today that legislation has completed its progress through Parliament. It 
will place a positive duty on public authorities to promote racial equality, 
to avoid discrimination before it occurs. I believe that this will 
significantly change the way in which public authorities approach the 
issue of race equality in the United Kingdom. It reflects our view that the 
public sector should lead by example. 
European Cooperation 
Within Europe we now have a further opportunity to improve anti-
discrimination legislation. The United Kingdom and Germany worked 
very closely together to ensure that the new anti-discrimination Directives 
under Article 13 of the European Treaty were logical and workable. As a 
result, the citizens of both our countries will be assured of protection 
against discrimination on grounds of race and on grounds of religion 
throughout Europe.  
And not just in the current Europe of the 15  - but also in an enlarged 
Europe. I hope that existing and prospective members of the EU can work 
together to share approaches on the treatment of ethnic and religious 
minorities.  
Uk’s Asylum And Immigration Policies 
No country can reach the pinnacle of good race relations without sound 
immigration policies. We are making improvements to both the a sylum 
system and to the immigration system. The UK has recently faced a sharp Creating a Multicultural Europe: the British approach 
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increase in asylum applicants - and rising public concern as a result. We 
are still receiving large numbers of genuine refugees.  
In those cases we must continue to meet our obligations under the Geneva 
Convention to provide protection. But we are also seeing an 
unprecedented increase in the number of economic migrants arriving in 
our countries. In many cases they are being facilitated by a highly 
organised people-trafficking criminal industry.  
That has put a severe strain on our procedures for determining who is a 
genuine refugee. One important part of the changes has been to speed up 
the whole of the asylum process. It was absurd for it to be taking on 
average twenty months for a decision to be made about people who were 
seeking asylum in our country. We are committed to making most initial 
asylum decisions within two months and appeals within a further four 
months, from April 2001. We are already meeting that target for families 
with children.  
Germany is also studying how to shorten its asylum procedures and that is 
one of the areas being addressed by your Immigration Commission. This 
is an area where Germany and the UK can work effectively together and 
where we are already exchanging ideas and experiences.  
We need effective immigration controls but our immigration policy must 
also respond to the emerging needs of the 21st century. It must take 
account of the ageing populations in Europe and the need to tackle skills 
shortages. The development of the global economy means that controls on 
immigration - vital as they are - will not be enough. We need to manage 
the opportunities provided by globalisation. 
As my colleague, the Immigration Minister, Barbara Roche said recently 
„We are in competition for the brightest and best talents  - the 
entrepreneurs, the scientists, the high technology specialists who make the 
global economy tick. In order to seize the opportunities of the knowledge 
economy, and to play a constructive part in shaping these huge changes, 
we need to explore carefully their implications for immigration policy.“  Baroness Scotland 
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Germany has recognised the new potential which globalisation provides 
and has taken action to benefit from it in the form of Green Cards for IT 
specialists from overseas. This is another area where we can learn from 
each other, and we await with interest the recommendations of your 
Immigration Commission next summer on possible immigration 
legislation. 
Conclusion 
Let me finish by saying that I’m very glad to have had this opportunity to 
clarify what British ideas about multiculturalism. We believe that 
integration is about enriching British society - through the blending in of 
new cultures and opening up our horizons. We believe in celebrating 
diversity. We believe that it is important for people to retain an affinity 
with their cultural roots as well as identifying fully with British society.  
But British multiculturalism is also about strong laws against racial 
discrimination. It is about opening up our political and other institutions 
to more ethnic minorities - I suppose I, and those of us around the table, 
are good examples. 
9% of the population in Germany are foreign nationals. You face many of 
the same issues as we do. But though we may have different starting 
points, we face many of the same challenges.  
And we share a common goal - to achieve fair, inclusive societies across 
Europe, where, regardless of race or religion, people feel themselves an 
equal part of the whole. 
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Cornelie Sonntag-Wolgast 
Integrating Foreigners: a German view 
„Migration and the Integration of Foreigners“ is an issue most vital to the 
further development of British, German and indeed all European 
societies. 
Having said that, I have to admit that this one short phrase alone already 
contains two major problems:  
Firstly: Who is to be considered a foreigner, and thus, who is to be 
integrated? 
Secondly: What do we mean when we talk of integration? What should it 
consist of? What should be the outcome of the integration process? 
Legally speaking, defining foreigners is very easy. According to the 
German Foreigners' Act, everybody who is not a German according to 
article 116 of our constitution is regarded as a foreigner. 
According to this definition we have about 7.3 million foreigners inside 
Germany at present. 
But written law and real life don't always match. 
A lot of these "foreigners" are not foreign to Germany at all. They have 
lived here for ten and more years and intend to stay for good. Some of 
them, again no small number, were born  and raised in Germany. So 
they're not "foreign" in the true sense of the term. And a rising number of 
foreigners have become German citizens through naturalization, without 
losing or cutting off their roots and ties to both family members and the 
country they themselves or their ancestors once came from. Cornelie Sonntag-Wolgast 
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Given the future effects of the new German citizenship law, which 
introduced the basic elements of "ius soli" and has been effective since 1 
January this year, we should start discussing new, more fitting 
definitions. 
In a word: the concept of "foreignness" has become tricky in our Europe 
of collapsing borders, especially if you want it to be your starting point 
for any policy on integration. 
Which leads to an even more severe conflict of definition: What do we 
mean when we talk about integration? 
You all know the catch-phrases: 
Integration is a two-way process! 
Integration is not assimilation! 
Integration is an important condition for becoming an integral part of the 
respective European society. I don't know anybody in German or 
European politics who would not agree that integration is the be-all and 
end-all of what we are talking about. But the moment you start talking 
about what you really mean by integration, there is ample space for 
disagreement. In Germany we have a bottom-line consensus that obeying 
each respective country's laws and learning each country's respective 
language are the cornerstones of any definition of integration. Any doubt 
about this is f utile: in order to be an active part of the country, city or 
even neighbourhood you live in, you have to be able to communicate - in 
order to understand what others expect from you and in order to be able 
to express your own expectations.  
But is that all? Isn't there anything beyond laws and language? W hat 
about basic common beliefs? What about common customs? What about a 
common German culture? These questions have been much discussed in 
Germany and all over Europe to much ballyhoo and with unpleasant 
results. 
I have a feeling that they are for the most part a more or less desperate 
attempt to make a stand against a- if you like - multicultural, certainly a Integrating Foreigners: a German view 
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multiethical Europe. (For multiculturalism in the age of the world wide 
web and mass migration  - the global village  - isn't something you can 
demand, defend, define or destroy. It's just there and has very little to do 
with the cultural romanticism it is usually associated with.) 
As complicated as coming to terms with the fast and totally changing 
fabric of our own societies might be, it would be downright easy if all we 
were talking about was how to integrate (again, whatever that may mean) 
the people who are already on the inside. 
But we have to discuss all these difficult and sensitive issues  - we will 
hear more than we all would surely like to about the need to combat 
racism - against an ever changing picture of worldwide migration. 
Those who leave their native land for good and migrate to another are 
often, almost by definition, the boldest and most capable, able to imagine 
a new life for themselves and their families. Living in another country, at 
least at first, without the necessary language and cultural skills, 
frequently scorned by the "lucky ones" who have already made it, means 
living by seizing opportunities. 
This is why migration is viewed upon by some as an adventure and a gain 
for the receiving societies  - and by some as a threat. Both for the same 
reasons. Politics and politicians have to meet the challenge of explaining 
developments to both sides and of making sure that this remains a process 
they are still able to govern. 
How many immigrants do our European societies need, if any? How many 
immigrants are they taking, how many can they take? Who is to be 
welcomed? According to which rules and conditions? Who is to name the 
criteria immigrants will have to meet? What kind of criteria are to be 
established? Who decides upon the quotas that have to accompany these 
criteria? What about the immigrants whose numbers cannot be predicted: 
asylum seekers, refugees from civil and other wars, family members?  
Questions much easier to ask than to answer. That's why the Minister of 
the Interior has summoned a Commission whose job it will be to come up 
with some answers to these questions: both on migration and integration. Cornelie Sonntag-Wolgast 
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And once more things are getting more complicated in the face of our 
ongoing fight against racism, xenophobia, harassment and attacks.  
The question is no longer whether we want to live together with people 
from other countries, other cultures or of other origin! It is how do we 
establish rules and ways to sustain a way of living together that leads to 
an understanding of each other and that decides conflicts by means of 
conviction and not of brute force?  
We have to get along with one another! Which includes discussing our 
fears when it comes to the issues of migration and integration as openly 
and honestly as we discuss our hopes and expectations. 
And as much as there is a German history to all this and a German 
framework and a German perception - the outcome is a European one. 
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Dieter Oberndörfer  
Multiculturalism – Enrichment of  
Society or Cause for Conflict? 
Every nation in Europe is now an immigration country. That includes 
Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece  - once the classic countries of 
emigration. Demographic developments, declining and ageing populations 
and the related demand for labour will force Europe to open up its 
societies to further increased immigration. 
That is particularly true for Germany. A statistical birth rate of 2.1 
children per female is a prerequisite for maintaining population stability 
in industrial societies, where there are high standards of medical care. 
However, in Germany the average birth rate has been 1.34 per female in 
recent years: foreigners account for 13.3% of all births and German 
women only 1.26%. The indigenous German population has declined by 
approximately 4 million since 1970 as a result of the low birth rate. The 
increase in population, which currently stands at over 82 million, is two-
thirds attributable to foreign immigration and one-third to the resettlement 
of ethnic Germans from eastern and southern Europe. The birth rate per 
foreign female has meanwhile fallen well below the 2.1 population 
stability factor to 1.6, and is still declining. 
Germany is not alone. All European Union and eastern European 
countries have a reproduction shortfall. The birth rate for Spanish (1.15), 
Italian (1.22) and Greek women (1.31) has fallen behind the German 
average. The population of these countries will therefore grow older and 
decline more quickly than t hat of Germany's. Portugal (1.44) and the 
Netherlands (1.55) have a higher birth rate than Germany. The countries 
with the most favourable birth rate are currently Great Britain (1.70) and Dieter Oberndörfer 
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France (1.72), Sweden, Denmark and Finland (1.61 to 1.74) and Ireland 
(1.91). Hungary, the Baltic States and Russia have extremely low birth 
rates comparable with those of Italy and Spain. The average for the Czech 
Republic (1.10) is even lower. Furthermore, this rapid population decline 
is accelerated by low life expectancy in eastern Europe. Life expectancy in 
Russia is now less than in India (60 years, 76 in Germany). In view of 
these demographic developments it is doubtful whether the former eastern 
bloc countries will have a sufficient reservoir of manpower to build 
competitive economies.  
The migration within Europe typical of the sixties and seventies  - of 
predominantly unskilled workers from Mediterranean countries seeking 
employment in the heavy industries of the north, in mining and in the 
service sector - has been at a low level for a long time. There was a great 
deal of coming and going until the beginning of the eighties. 24 million of 
the 30 million people who came to Germany have since returned to their 
home countries. Almost 8% of Greece’s population worked for a while in 
Germany. On the other hand, there has been a significant increase in the 
migration of highly qualified engineers, scientists and top executives 
within Europe. 
For many years the most important cause of immigration has been the 
reunification o f families, not the recruitment of labour. The increase in 
Germany’s foreign population from around 4 million at the beginning of 
the nineties to 7.3 million is primarily due to family reunification and 
natural reproduction. There are over two million Turks living in 
Germany, the largest group of immigrants in the country. Immigrants 
came and still come from the periphery of Europe, North Africa and a 
variety of third world countries and regions. The flood of immigrants from 
eastern Europe anticipated by many after the collapse of communism has 
so far failed to materialise. As a result of their low birth rate, eastern 
European countries will also have to rely on foreign workers to build their 
economies. Poland is already a country of immigration for workers from 
Belarus, Ukraine and Russia. Hungary too took in immigrants from 
Rumania and the former Yugoslavia and exports only an insignificant Multiculturalism – Enrichment of Society or Cause for Conflict? 
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percentage of its own workforce. It has been estimated that the European 
Union will require between 35-40 million immigrants to alleviate the 
economic and social impact of a shrinking and ageing population. 
According to a survey carried out by the distinguished migration expert 
Rainer Münz, net-migration from eastern European will not exceed 4 
million in coming decades. S everal studies suggest net-migration to 
Germany itself will be around 300,000  – 500,000 a year. With 300,000 
new arrivals each year, the proportion of immigrants in the population 
would rise from currently 9% to 20% over a period of 35 years, i.e. to 
the s ame level of foreigners living in Switzerland at the present time. 
However, a fairly moderate increase in naturalisations, particularly now 
that children born in Germany of foreign parents (ius soli) can be 
naturalised, would reduce this figure to 13-15%.  Since eastern Europe 
will cease to be an additional source of labour, Europe and Germany will 
in future have to depend primarily on immigration from non-European 
countries. The proportion of non-Europeans in the population will 
therefore increase considerably. Over half the population will be of non-
German descent in large urban areas (already 32% at present in 
Frankfurt-on-Main).  
In the long term, immigration alone will not be able to halt the decline in 
and ageing of the population as immigrants themselves grow old and also 
adopt the reproduction behaviour patterns of the indigenous population. 
Energetic birth promotion policies along the lines of the very successful 
ones adopted in France and the Nordic States are essential. These 
countries show that a high rate of female employment is compatible with a 
high birth rate. Spain and Italy have not only the lowest birth rate but 
also the lowest employment quota for women in Europe. 
The birth rate in France is currently 1.7 and is expected to increase. As a 
result, the population in France will decline by only four million by 2050. 
Germany’s population would fall by 17 million over the same period if 
there were no more immigration.  
Socially acceptable and well-organised immigration coupled with an 
effective birth policy might give Germany time to postpone and cushion Dieter Oberndörfer 
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the social impact of a decline in population which is inevitable in the long 
term. Even an increase of 10-15% in the birth rate would significantly 
slow down the ageing of the population. Large-scale immigration policies 
are urgently required. But in future the main problem will be finding the 
millions of qualified immigrants needed in many sectors of industry across 
Europe. The Green Card fiasco  – in six months, just over 3,000 
applicants have registered for 20,000 Cards  – shows that the current 
debate in Germany is divorced from reality. 
In future Germany will have to compete with other countries for qualified 
immigrants and this rivalry will very soon intensify. 
This state of affairs has until now gone unacknowledged, despite the 
negative immigration balance in 1997 and 1998, when more people left 
than came to Germany. The small immigration surplus in 1999 was due 
solely to the arrival of about 80,000 ethnic Germans from eastern Europe, 
a phenomenon which will soon be a thing of the past. 
At the same time, public debate continues to be determined by the petty 
protective strategies used by populist demagogy. Demands have been 
made for even stiffer restrictions on political asylum, even though the 
Federal Republic only holds eleventh place in Europe in relation to the 
size of its population. Germany has little chance against international 
competition with its recent Green and Blue Card initiatives - an attempt to 
repeat the earlier, extremely anti-integrationist, German "guest worker" 
model of recruiting for temporary stays only. Potential migrants will go to 
the countries offering the most promising long-term perspectives. 
Germany is certainly not one of those. Demands for immigrants to adjust 
to the German dominant culture ( Leitkultur)  and fit in with lifestyle and 
customs of the local population can have only a deterrent effect. They are 
a summons to harassment or cultural rape by the local population. In 
particular, such demands mean that members of  what were once alien 
religions such as Muslims, Hindus or Confucians acquire the status of a 
"tolerated", non-German minority  - as did the Jews in earlier times. 
Mosques have replaced synagogues as alien, non-German places of 
worship. Even if Tamils or Africans put on  Lederhosen with knee-Multiculturalism – Enrichment of Society or Cause for Conflict? 
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stockings, yodelled and dyed their skin and hair the “right” colour, they 
would still be recognisable as “foreigners” and therefore deemed not to fit 
in. Anyone who insists that immigrants kow-tow to the views and customs 
of a provincial culture is in truth trying to hinder further immigration. 
Immigrants from India and China can become good, law-abiding citizens, 
but they will never metamorphose into Catholic-Bavarian farmers or 
Swabian pietists. It is high time that we stopped this embarrassing talk 
about Leitkultur. Article 3 of the Basic Law states inter alia that "nobody 
should be prejudiced or f avoured because of their sex, birth, national 
origin or faith. " Some proponents of the  Leitkultur  maintain that the 
Basic Law is their yardstick. It would be logical if they applied this 
principle to immigrants too. 
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Trevor Phillips 
Multiculturalism – Enrichment of  
Society or Cause for Conflict? 
I want to make a few observations about the issue of multiculturalism in 
Europe and start from the point of view of London. It now has the largest 
and most diverse population of any city in Europe. It is significant that in 
the UK half of the ethnic minority population live in London and by 2011, 
one third of all Londoners will come from visible ethnic minority 
backgrounds. 
These communities are not homogeneous. They range from well-
established immigrants (reaching back one thousand years) to the children 
of newly-arrived refugees. Their origins are from across the world, with 
about forty-five different communities of more than 10,000 people each in 
London. There are religious and cultural differences  - we have a large 
Muslim population as well as an historically large Jewish population. 
Refugees and asylum-seekers account for just under  six per cent of the 
Greater London population - a very large number.  
As in the rest of Europe, minority ethnic groups are overrepresented in 
UK statistics on deprivation. They are disproportionately concentrated in 
deprived areas. Many housing estates are becoming an island of 
difference within the city and populated largely by people of colour, 
people from refugee or asylum-seeking backgrounds. At the other end of 
the scale, 60 out of every 1000 people in the UK are from visible ethnic 
minority groups. But when we look at our representation in the democracy 
as a test of the issue of integration we find that of the 1000 or so 
representatives  
 Trevor Phillips 
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who are elected in the UK  - members of the House of Commons, 
European Parliament and devolved assemblies in Scotland, Wales and 
London, only 14 are people of colour, compared to the sixty or so that 
would be there if they were represented in proportion to their numbers. 
These statistics are cause for concern, demonstrating symbolically a 
worrying level of exclusion.  
The issue of multiculturalism has vexed Britain since the war. In the last 
couple of years it has become newly controversial because of the killing of 
a young man called Stephen Lawrence in South East London. When the 
present British government came into power in 1997 it launched a major 
inquiry under the Judge Lord MacPherson into this death. The i nquiry 
came up with a number of important findings. Two are particularly 
relevant to our thinking about multiculturalism in Europe. 
First, we can become too focused on the issue of attitude and the question 
of whether we like people of a different race or not. As a result, we may 
miss the most significant factor in community and race relations in 
Britain, what MacPherson called "Institutional Racism". Loosely, this is 
a persistent characteristic of institutions such as government institutions, 
schools, courts, private companies etc. It leads to a situation where 
minority ethnic groups are underrepresented at the highest levels and 
consistently disadvantaged. This persistent discrimination seems to resist 
all kinds of individual efforts. This is an important point for Europeans. 
Discrimination and Disadvantage, integration issues and multiculturalism 
are not simply about whether you get on with your neighbours. They are 
about outcomes as well as the motivation of individuals. 
Second, when we consider the issues of disadvantage and inequality, we 
need to bear in mind that treating everyone in the same way does not 
result in everyone having the same opportunity. People s tart from 
different situations. Refugees in the UK may not know English and so be 
at a disadvantage from the outset.  
This is an issue which will concern Europe as a whole, not least because 
we are discovering that a healthy, growing economy needs to attract Multiculturalism – Enrichment of Society or Cause for Conflict? 
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immigrant labour. In post-war Britain this was essential. That's why my 
own parents came to Britain. My father spent some time on construction 
sites rebuilding London. My sister worked in the newly-created health 
service. In Europe, and especially London, we are seeing the 
restructuring of our economy, where we do not have the level of skilled 
labour and people with the right educational qualifications and 
backgrounds to meet our particular needs. Thus 10% of the 400,000 jobs 
in the UK's IT sector are vacant. This sector is growing at 30% a year, 
so we will need another 30,000 people every single year. Estimates 
suggest that by the middle of this decade there will be a shortfall of 
around 300,000.  
In London, possibly the greatest threat to what is the most substantial, 
fastest-growing city economy in Europe is a critical labour shortage in the 
public sector. In some of our hospitals, one third of our nurses are from 
agencies, because we cannot recruit permanent staff. We are going 
abroad to recruit nurses and teachers. We have approximately 2000 fewer 
police than we need (26,000 instead of 28,000). These are all strong 
drivers for immigration. 
If this is where we are going, how, in a multicultural Europe, do we 
ensure that we maintain social cohesion, while giving people rights and 
the status they require to integrate into society? As we move closer and 
closer together, Europe as a whole will need some common principles. It 
is easy for us to agree that we are against Haiderism, the National Front 
and s imilar movements. But we need to confront questions on cultural 
conflict and cultural freedoms. We need to begin to consider a contract of 
citizenship with those who are seeking to settle permanently in Europe. 
That contract would be a very simple thing. Those who come to Europe 
make a commitment to the country they are in and by extension to Europe 
itself. In return they are offered protection against discrimination and 
social exclusion.  
It is right for us to begin to consider a formal relationship which gives 
people coming to live in Europe a sense of the right of their being here 
and establishes that the society into which they come accepts them - not Trevor Phillips 
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on sufferance, not as guest workers who may go back somewhere else, but 
as people who have come to contribute to the economic and social well-
being of the country in which they are living. We might give people a 
guarantee of social rights but could expect them to work for voluntary 
organisations for a period - a very strong tradition in the UK which plays 
an important part in integrating people from abroad.  
As part of the guarantee of rights against discrimination, the British 
government is taking steps to extend our race relations legislation. We 
have also now incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights 
into our legislation in the UK. This will have a huge impact on protecting 
people belonging to minorities. The race relations amendment will 
prohibit discrimination by public authorities in carrying out any of their 
functions and impose a statutory duty o n public authorities to promote 
racial equality.  
These things will not happen easily and simply. In the UK there is a 
strong groundswell of opposition to the idea of multiculturalism. The point 
is that the English are nothing else but a nation of immigrants. The 
original inhabitants of England now live in Scotland and Wales, where 
they were pushed out by the Vikings and Germans. Richard the Lionheart, 
who is represented as the quintessential English King, spent only one year 
in England and never learned to speak English. The English patron Saint, 
St George, was a Palestinian. Despite this, we have created a national 
identity which can exclude multiculturalism and there is a major country 
in the UK to define that - England.  
This is mixed up with the issue of European integration and our position 
in Europe. And the arguments on Europe are now spilling over into the 
definition of Englishness and Britishness. This in itself is a territory where 
the issue of multiculturalism becomes extremely contentious. 
A survey of British people showed that 6 million adults in Britain do not 
subscribe to British identity. This is important. A British identity is one 
which is inclusive. An English identity is exclusive. It is white, male etc. 
One third of those not subscribing  to British identity admit to being Multiculturalism – Enrichment of Society or Cause for Conflict? 
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racially prejudiced, compared to 16% of those identifying themselves as 
British. They are also more likely to think that immigrants take jobs away 
from people who were born in Britain. One quarter of them say that equal 
opportunities for Blacks and Asians in Great Britain have gone too far. 
They are twice as likely as the average to say that people cannot be truly 
English unless they are white, born in England and have English parents, 
and they are the most eurosceptic part of the population. Three quarters 
think we should keep the pound. 22% think we should leave the EU 
altogether.  
So this is very sensitive territory in the UK. It is not just about minorities, 
it is about who we are as people. We need to be careful when considering 
this issue not to fall into two traps. First, to think that multiculturalism is 
just about being nice to minorities. Multiculturalism is a much more 
fundamental issue to do with who we are as British people, as Germans, 
as Europeans. 
Second, when we deal with the issue of racism, it is not just to do with 
how we treat each other as individuals. The issue of racism and 
discrimination is more than anything else about how we structure our 
society to ensure that people, whatever their colour, or background or 
tradition, h ave an equal chance to do well in the society. And the only 
way we can test this is by looking at the results. How many people are 
employed at what level in what companies? Who represents our people? 
Who is included in discussions about the future of our nation? 
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Barbara John  
Multiculturalism – Enrichment of  
Society or Cause for Conflict? 
Let me start with two different thoughts, which could mobilisepeople 
either for or against immigration. 
First, there are more than 500,000 people living in Berlin whose mother 
tongue is not German. Second, inner city areas like Kreuzberg and 
Tiergarten, which were previously economically rundown, have been 
revived by immigrants.  
In Berlin we have tried to exploit the strengths of immigration. Thus we 
have granted business permits to immigrants much earlier than after the 
normal eight years. We have also introduced examinations assessing a 
firm's suitability for training. That means that people who might be 
defeated by German's strict trading regulations can attend courses which 
qualify them to train apprentices. And we have also carried out a 
programme to encourage self-employment.  
Integration of immigrants is made more difficult as a result of legal 
regulations. There are far fewer of these in Britain, but it is still a 
problem in Germany. For example, there is a regulation which says that 
foreigners, in contrast to Germans, can only work for wages set by 
collective agreement. Before they can get a work permit they have to 
prove that they are earning this level of wages. Otherwise they do not get 
the work permit.  
In my view, however, work is one of the most important methods of 
integration, because work helps people to learn German, improve their 
qualifications, strengthens social contacts and leads to recognition by the Barbara John 
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majority society. Advancement through education is a decisive factor for 
success in society. Trevor Phillips is right. The issue is not whether or not 
we like foreigners. Treating people kindly is a matter of course. It is 
about rights. It is about whether the institutions of education and the 
labour market and the laws governing them allow immigrants, with the 
help of support measures, to be as successful as the indigenous population 
- at least within two or three generations. That is crucial for their success 
in society. 
Of course there are problems for the majority too, which we must 
understand. If the majority accept immigration, then it is in the 
expectation that it will not disadvantage them, but that at the very least 
everything should remain as it is. They do not expect that their children 
should suddenly form a minority at school. That is a situation which 
occurs frequently in Berlin. In Kreuzberg there are schools in which not a 
single child has German as a mother tongue. German children are not 
even in the minority there - they are simply not present at all!  
As you can see, the majority here are struggling with their assumptions 
and fears that their own children's educational prospects are getting 
worse. A number of measures  are being taken to lessen the fears of the 
German population, such as more all-day schools in the inner city areas. 
With the right combination of problem solving and problem analysis it is 
possible to achieve positive attitudes towards immigrant minorities and a 
greater pluralism - but also to make the wrong decisions.  
It is essential that all institutions, from the cradle to the grave  - 
incidentally, can immigrants be buried in Germany if they are Muslims? - 
must be carefully considered. And between cradle and grave there is a 
great deal that needs to be changed still. We must change things, so that 
immigrants feel included. They must also share responsibility for 
integration. We are trying to achieve that here in Berlin by giving direct 
financial support  to many projects for minorities, which undertake 
integration measures. This includes giving minorities places to display 
their cultures. We have done this in Berlin in the House of Cultures and 
the Workshop of Cultures. It also means really resolving the e veryday Multiculturalism – Enrichment of Society or Cause for Conflict? 
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conflicts which arise between the majority and minority, taking care not to 
rely on schematic solutions. For example, when a conflict flares up over 
housing. The commercial landlords write the normal letters, but they have 
to obey the tenancy laws. No one goes along to talk to the people, no one 
looks for arbitrators, there are no mediation programmes. Cities must of 
course try to manage these things better than has hitherto been the case.  
I want to address the question of the dominant culture once more. In 
European societies and particularly in German society, it is crucial that 
there is not too wide a gap between national identity and democratic 
values, otherwise immigration will become a lasting conflict. If the 
national element dominates, if people are supposed to be initiated into 
obscure b ehaviour patterns, then it will only be possible to detect the 
deviations from the norm. People will notice that others look different, 
pray differently, go into different places of worship - and that will lead to 
constant irritations. But if we change our institutions and expand our 
national concept of German society so that every group is allowed to 
identify with its cultural origin, to develop it and to integrate it into this 
national concept, then we can make full use of our existing wonderful 
democratic system, which already functions well in bringing together 
societies from different cultural backgrounds.  
Integration is not just about tolerating - it does not mean accepting with 
gritted teeth. It is about adopting a positive attitude, because immigration 
brings huge advantages - not just economic, though these are the first to 
be noticed - to every society. 
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Josef Voß  
Combating Racism and Promoting  
Integration – The Role of Government 
The difficulties t hat the German "majority" and the various ethnic 
minorities have living together should not be underestimated. The fact that 
these difficulties are acknowledged and discussed publicly should not be 
confused with xenophobia. Problems can only be tackled if they are talked 
about openly.  
However, there is an obstacle  - whether conscious or unconscious  - to 
rational debate: one of the reasons for defensive xenophobic attitudes can 
be found in the disorientation the population feels in the face of the 
challenges to society presented by migration, integration and minorities. 
The oft-repeated phrase “The Federal Republic is not a country of 
immigration” disguises the fact that millions of foreigners have migrated 
to Germany and this is their home. Thus in a social and cultural sense, 
Germany has indeed become a new type of country of immigration. What 
this means has still not been appreciated. Migration can only be managed 
if it is generally accepted that it has become a permanent feature of and 
challenge to our society. 
Essential elements for a permanent climate of co-
operation 
Oppose xenophobia, promote integration; this goal can only be managed 
if the necessary steps are taken to create a climate in which Germans and 
foreigners can live together in peace and freedom.  Josef Voß 
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Responsible use of language versus simplistic slogans 
Threats to make policy on foreign nationals into an election topic and 
calls to keep the subject of foreigners out of elections are out of step with 
reality. Migration policy is social policy in its broadest sense. Migration 
issues are no longer marginal problems, rather, they are a central policy 
challenge for society. They will probably gain in importance in Germany 
and in Europe generally. Migration policy can only be successful if it is 
supported by a very broad consensus. In a democracy, it cannot be 
enforced against the will of the indigenous majority, otherwise there will 
be dangerous consequences particularly harmful to ethnic minorities, but 
also to the political system as a whole. The indigenous majority must be 
courted over and again for their acceptance of migration policy and 
immigrant minorities. That requires broad-based factual information and 
debate.  
Speak out difficult truths 
One of these difficult truths is the fact that immigration, migration, 
resettlement, expulsion and political asylum have become permanent facts 
of life in German society and the rest of Europe. We speak about the 
globalisation of the economy and the financial markets, about the 
globalisation of transport and communication: Germany is dependent on 
open borders for its exports. But it is illusory to imagine that borders can 
be hermetically sealed against people, especially in view of the growing 
gap between rich and poor which, in future, will also increase migratory 
pressures on prosperous Europe.  
From the integration of expellees and refugees from former German 
territories in eastern Europe after World War II, to the recruitment of 
foreign workers begun in the fifties and the increasing number of asylum 
seekers  and refugees from civil wars, there has never been a politically 
clear-cut and easily understandable programme for managing 
immigration through social and economic measures and for promoting Combating Racism and Promoting Integration – The Role of Government 
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integration for immigrants who remain in Germany. There will never be a 
simple solution. 
The immigrants include in their number German emigrants, 
predominantly from the former Soviet Union, who suffered from the late 
effects of World War II and have a constitutional right to return to 
Germany. 
One of the bitter truths i s that in the medium and longer-term, 
demographic development in Germany will require permanent 
immigration, going far beyond the recruitment of specialists. In the years 
ahead, the so-called generation contract that secures old age pensions 
will not only  become a financial problem, given Germany's ageing 
population, it will also become difficult to find sufficient workers. 
Whoever calls for a change to the political right to asylum in Germany's 
Basic Law, must explain why he believes this is necessary, given that an 
amendment to Article 16a of the Basic Law would bring about the 
collapse of the whole system of safe third-country rules. The Federal 
Republic will continue to be bound by the standards laid down in the 
Geneva Convention on Refugees, which are applied to the vast majority of 
applications for asylum. Furthermore, the precedence of European Law 
allows the Federal Republic relatively little leeway.  
Whoever questions the right of an individual to political asylum as 
opposed to an institutional guarantee touches on Germany's recent 
history. The fathers of the Constitution formulated political asylum as an 
individual right in response to the bitter experiences under Nazi 
dictatorship. In substance, the difference between individual right to 
asylum and  an institutional guarantee is minimal, since the Geneva 
Convention on Refugees t akes precedence. However, this individual right 
is our contribution to the development of human rights. Our country and 
our society must continue to be aware of this historic responsibility . It is 
impossible to speak of fatherland and nation without acknowledging the 
fatherland's past. Josef Voß 
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Opposing xenophobia – promoting integration 
When the German-Italian recruitment agreement, a precursor of state-
organised recruitment of foreign labour, was introduced in 1955, many 
expellees and refugees had not yet been fully integrated into their new 
homeland in the West following the war. However, since that time there 
has never been a policy for the integration of immigrants. The economy 
needed workers and assumed that after a while they would return to their 
home countries and be replaced by new foreign workers. It was not part 
of the plan that people would want to bring their families to Germany, 
some of them permanently. Initially, the only interest was in integrating 
them into the labour market. There were no special efforts to integrate 
those who were not part of the labour market. One result was that many 
first-generation foreigner workers, and in particular the women, were 
scarcely integrated linguistically. We are still burdened with this legacy, 
especially with regard to the generation of guest workers from a different 
cultural background, for example Turkey. 
What does integration mean? 
Many talk of integration but have contradictory ideas about what the word 
means. It does not mean the greatest possible assimilation into German 
ways of thinking and life style. 
The integration of immigrants who remain in Germany permanently is a 
long-term process that demands effort on the part of both immigrants and 
German society. It is therefore a reciprocal process requiring the active 
support and encouragement of state and social organisations as well as 
the media. Integration means that people who live in Germany 
permanently must also participate in our society with the same rights and 
responsibilities.  Combating Racism and Promoting Integration – The Role of Government 
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Linguistic integration 
Anyone who wants to participate in German life must master the German 
language, an essential prerequisite for communication within the 
community. This is a debt that will have to be discharged by those who 
live in Germany permanently, even if they retain their identity through 
their mother tongue and traditions. In order to achieve this goal it is our 
duty to ensure that integration policy differentiates between different 
groups of immigrants. German language teaching must be promoted for 
all ethnic groups. That requires comprehensive access to language 
courses across the country, with continued language study made 
dependent on successful participation in these courses. In this context, the 
indigenous population must also be made more conscious of the 
advantages of being able to speak several foreign languages. 
Allegiance to our country on the basis of our 
constitution 
Anyone who wishes to stay in Germany permanently should be required to 
swear allegiance to our free state on the basis of our Basic Law and the 
values which it represents. The constitution, which recognises people as 
individuals and acknowledges the inviolability of the dignity of each 
person, whether male or female, young or old, disabled or able-bodied, 
born or unborn, German national or foreigner, is the basis for living 
together in freedom, justice and peace. To achieve this goal, cross-
cultural issues should be addressed in nursery schools and then dealt with 
in  greater depth in schools, vocational institutes and universities. 
Language tuition should also include civics and information about job 
training possibilities.  
Legal integration 
Foreigners who live here permanently, especially the second and third 
generations who were born and belong here, ought, where possible, to be Josef Voß 
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able to help shape our political life with all rights and responsibilities, 
without having to give up their own identity and culture in the process. It 
is in our own interest and in the spirit of our constitution to ensure that 
the inhabitants of our country and the nation state do not fall apart, 
leaving a large part of the population permanently marginalised. Against 
this background, legal integration means naturalisation, and is the basis 
for immigrants to identify with our state and society, regardless of their 
own identity and culture. 
Social integration 
Integration into the labour market is important for social integration. It 
gives immigrants the means to care for themselves and their families and 
take on responsibility for others. The potential in immigrant groups and 
organisations should be harnessed for this purpose. Such organisations 
need the same support and back-up as indigenous associations.  
Government offices and institutions catering for large numbers of 
immigrants must adapt their services and working methods according to 
the needs of immigrants. Staff working for government offices and 
institutions should be encouraged to acquire essential cross-cultural skills 
and g iven the n ecessary training. Appointing immigrants with cross-
cultural competences, for example knowledge of foreign languages, 
should be considered as a criterion for employment with such 
organisations. 
The unique contribution made by foreign language 
communities. 
The Church has always been and always will look upon itself as a 
universal Church. From the beginning, there has only ever been one 
Church in the various languages, cultures and traditions, based on the 
gospel and one faith. Native language missions have proved themselves in 
the Catholic Church over past decades. The facilities provided in native-Combating Racism and Promoting Integration – The Role of Government 
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language missions make it possible for individual groups to meet and 
communicate with each other. Many immigrants have found orientation, 
support and help from the gospel and community services celebrated in 
their native tongue and have also found a home in our Church. Religious 
and social services in foreign languages have been the Church’s response 
to the fact that culture, tradition, customs and language influence the way 
faith is taught and practised, and in so doing have satisfied an elementary 
need for sanctuary and solidarity in a way that German-speaking parishes 
would be unable to fulfil satisfactorily.  
The dialogue with Muslims 
Approximately 2.5 million Muslims live in Germany. Most were recruited 
as foreign workers from Turkey, the former Yugoslavia and north African 
countries. It is not so well known that several thousand Germans belong 
to the Islamic faith. 
Muslims are predominantly foreigner nationals a nd live in a minority 
religious and social group. This makes dialogue between Christians and 
Muslims difficult. There is also the problem of Muslim citizens 
concentrated in housing ghettos. The interfaith dialogue between 
Christians and Muslims is not just ambitious, it is also vital and there is a 
great deal more to be done. Mutual trust is essential. 
Muslims benefit from the religious freedom guaranteed under the Basic 
Law in the same way as members of Christian churches and other 
religious denominations. They have the right to practice their faith freely 
and to organise and join in religious activities. Parents also have the right 
to pass on their faith and traditions to their children. It is part of their 
identity. Our foreign policy should also demand reciprocity and the same 
freedom for Christians in Islamic countries. 
However, Muslims, like members of other religions, are also bound by the 
constitutional order, especially by the inviolability of human dignity, 
equal rights for the sexes and a criminal  code governed by the rule of 
law. The preconditions for Islamic religious instruction should be Josef Voß 
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regulated in accordance with Section 7 Paragraph 3 of the Basic Law, 
i.e. in the German language, in accordance with educational provisions 
for schools and supervised by the state. 
Meeting Places and experiencing life together 
In the final analysis, the process of integration will only succeed if both 
sides trust each other. How this trust grows will depend on how the 
various immigrant groups are accepted in society, including the 
experience they have of Germans and vice-versa, which can become a 
basis for mutual respect and tolerance. We should not underestimate the 
role which immigrant associations and organisations play in this process. 
A vital condition for respect is the protection of marriage and family. This 
protection is sacrosanct and must be taken into consideration in all forms 
of legislation. Immigrants' freedom to live here and support our system 
and society out of conviction will only grow if this security is ensured.  
Encouraging integration on a broad basis 
Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen, the Federal government’s third 
Commissioner for Foreigners, wrote that “integration is a right and an 
effort to which there is no alternative”. The Federal government can look 
back on a tradition of very successful integration policy, not just for the 
12 million expelled persons and refugees after World War II but also for 
the 4 million people who have resettled here since. Another important step 
is the reform of the nationality laws. 
Dealing with the substantive task of integration remains a challenge. We 
live in a society with many different life styles and living standards. For 
this reason, integration cannot and must not mean assimilation, but a 
permanent process of reaching agreement on the basic principles and 
rules for living together. This necessitates a comprehensive choice of 
integration assistance and guidance, including mediation facilities and Combating Racism and Promoting Integration – The Role of Government 
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social support. Realistic mechanisms for dealing with conflict, especially 
violent disputes between young people, are also necessary. 
Social integration calls for mutual acceptance and tolerance between the 
various ethnic groups as well as equal opportunities in the key sectors of 
society and the economy. Training for this must commence in childhood. 
As necessary as the discussion on banning the NPD may be, it does not 
give full justice to the problems ahead. Total loss of direction and a sense 
of the futility of life are also evident in right-wing extremist violence. 
The i dea that our political system needs an ethical foundation of basic 
values, which the state by itself cannot provide, is either being forgotten 
or has been suppressed. The preamble to the Basic Law assumes 
“responsibility before God and the People”. If this transcendental 
dimension is lost, if the sense of religious mystery in society disappears, 
then a sense of the inherent mystery of the individual will also disappear. 
Hans Jonas, a reliable contemporary witness, observed that a society 
which allows i tself the luxury of holding nothing sacred and dismisses 
virtues such as respect, reverence, responsibility and loyalty as obsolete 
need not be surprised if violence is only one small step away.  
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Vural Öger 
Combating Racism and Promoting  
Integration – The Role of Government 
Over 50 years since the end of the Second World War all Western 
European countries are democratic states and set the highest standards of 
human rights. Xenophobia and ring-wing extremism are no longer 
compatible with the conception European countries have of themselves. 
Human rights apply to all citizens, regardless of their origin, skin colour 
or culture. Due to its own past history, Germany in particular has a 
humanitarian obligation to combat xenophobia and right-wing extremism. 
There are also vital selfish interests, such as economic and demographic 
necessities, which mean that Europe and above all Germany are actually 
dependent on foreigners and immigrants. And a society which expects a 
significant section of the population to work, pay taxes and contribute to 
pension funds yet neither grants them any rights nor protects them from 
discrimination cannot live in peace in the long term. 
Unfortunately, however, we cannot claim that governments are perfect in 
fulfilling their role in combating racism and promoting integration. We 
repeatedly see discrepancies between beliefs, words and deeds. 
Let us stay with the example of Germany for the moment. As you know, 
the economic miracle of the 1960s required foreign labour. People 
recruited from various countries, including Spain, Italy, Greece and 
Turkey, made a major contribution to Germany’s development. Both hosts 
and guests thought these workers would only stay for a limited period. But 
despite repatriation measures and a halt to further recruitment, the 
number of Turks in Germany rose to 2.3 million. Many of them are now 
third-generation immigrants. Yet the government at the time insisted that Vural Öger 
52 
Germany was not an immigration country. As a result, little effort was 
made to plan or implement programmes to promote integration. 
Foreigners became second-class citizens. Their work was not recognised. 
On the contrary, the boat was full. Some elements of the media and the 
“indigenous” population treated foreigners and the subject of foreigners 
in the same  way as the government. They spoke of excessive foreign 
influence, foreign crime etc. It is therefore no wonder that this situation 
escalated in the early 90s to such an extent that hostels for asylum-seekers 
were attacked and foreigners physically assaulted. But the government of 
the day saw no reason to act against xenophobia and promote integration. 
They regarded events more as justification for changing the law on 
asylum. 
Things did not start to improve in Germany until there was a change of 
government.  The new government introduced a law on citizenship aimed 
at promoting legal integration. The wave of violence in the summer of 
2000 was perceived as a very serious problem. Not only was public regret 
expressed at the attacks but specific measures were also introduced. For 
the first time there was a clear statement that Germany needs immigration 
for its own future. All this may not be enough. Some sections of society 
are certainly still against foreigners and the process of integration has a 
long way to go. But I can finally see some movement in society. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, governments must take the fight against 
xenophobia and the promotion of integration very seriously and advance 
these causes consistently. In my opinion there are three essential goals: 
Instigation to commit violence, the imitation and glorification of Nazi 
tyranny, all right-wing extremist acts of violence and criminal xenophobia 
must be systematically recorded, make public and punished. That applies 
in particular to ringleaders and those pulling the strings behind the 
scenes.  
Thorough judicial investigation is essential so that immigrants become 
aware of the qualities of a state governed by the rule of law. The victims 
of discrimination and xenophobia must learn what their legal defence Combating Racism and Promoting Integration – The Role of Government 
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possibilities are. They must know how and where they can file a complaint 
or report an offence. Many foreigners have no confidence in German 
authorities; the number of unreported offences is therefore likely to be 
high. An independent control body must be created. 
People of foreign origin are still largely regarded as a threat to society. 
Their cultural and economic contribution remains unrecognised. This is 
due to the lack of support programmes since mass immigration began. 
This also applies to the call for immigrants to learn the German language 
which has now been voiced with delay. The authorities, the media and 
school systems need new, sensitive and constructive answers to the real 
issue of immigration. Germany needs an immigration law. But this law 
must not be employed exclusively as a bureaucratic instrument. It must be 
linked to a comprehensive integration programme. 
Carefully considered and comprehensive programmes will be required to 
achieve these aims. I should like to make some specific proposals: 
Victims of discrimination, xenophobia and right-wing violence often do 
not know how to defend themselves. The government must provide citizens 
of foreign origin with a manual to assist them in safeguarding their rights 
and to heighten their civic awareness. 
German society must commit itself to a uniform programme against all 
forms of discrimination. The government can contribute towards ensuring 
that companies and trade unions, churches, authorities, schools and the 
media agree on a united approach and implement guidelines in their 
respective areas to combat incitement against foreigners and racial 
intolerance. I believe it is particularly important to fight everyday 
discrimination which is now accepted as normality. And politicians must 
finally stop conducting election campaigns on the backs of foreigners. 
The state can work closely together here with industrial associations. 
Many entrepreneurs and trade unionists in particular know that right-wing 
violence can seriously damage the image of German industry and deal a 
major blow to the attractiveness of Germany as a business location. Vural Öger 
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I place special emphasis on information work in schools and universities. 
Changing society’s attitude from xenophobic to xenophile is nothing less 
than a major cultural transformation. Our children and young people 
must learn from an early age that people of a different origin, a different 
culture and different way of thinking are an enrichment, that by being 
open and curious they can learn something from them and that differing 
ideas can multiply to produce a better result. Our children and young 
people will become more creative and flexible as a consequence, they will 
be better team players and gain a broader perspective on the world. I ask 
myself: what better thing could happen to them? 
But teachers must be given instruments to combat negligent apathy and 
open or latent racism. In kindergartens, schools and universities, 
foreigners must be presented as valuable for Germany’s culture, economy 
and future. The most modern media must be employed to bring our 
children and young people into contact with different cultures. 
But that is just part of the tasks in the education sector. Foreigners, or 
rather immigrants, must have adequate command of the German 
language. They must know something about the history of their new 
country. They must also accept the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of 
Germany as their constitution. Foreign children and young people must 
understand how they can achieve their desired professions and positions 
in society. They must accept above all that school studies are generally 
the path to success. The state must educate and train immigrants via 
kindergartens, schools and general courses. But children and young 
people should not be regarded as the exclusive target  group. It is 
important also to target the parental homes, the fathers and mothers.  
In addition to the education system, support must also be given to the 
cultural sector so that, for example, we experience Turks not only as 
conveyor-belt workers in headscarves but also as entrepreneurs, 
scientists, musicians, painters, writers, sculptors, film-makers or actors. 
The state should promote corresponding projects. Combating Racism and Promoting Integration – The Role of Government 
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It is equally gratifying to see that at least the public broadcasting 
corporations are establishing editorial groups dedicated to the topics of 
right-wing extremism, xenophobia and immigration. Press freedom must 
naturally be respected but I think the state can also assume a supporting 
role here. 
I advocate a network of local authorities to combat right-wing violence. In 
the past, a lack of funding has prevented them from establishing a shared 
database. But we have recognised that there are organised networks, 
international links and spiritual leaders behind right-wing violence. We 
must get used to the idea of building up our own democratic network of 
general vigilance. This network must register all the words and deeds of 
right-wing extremism and xenophobia. As recent cases in Germany have 
unfortunately shown, it must also examine what measures are taken 
against offenders by the people and authorities in charge. 
Furthermore, the network must serve as a lever to enable individual 
committed people and organisations to strengthen the effect of their 
activities. Regrettably, there is too little cooperation in Germany. 
The fight against right-wing extremism must be placed on a European 
footing. Most of what is occurring in Germany is also happening in other 
countries. That cannot serve as an excuse but must spur us on to broad 
cooperation. 
I think it is essential also to cooperate with the USA, with organisations 
such as the Anti-Defamation League. In terms of practical experience in 
dealing with right-wing extremism and xenophobia, the USA is way ahead 
of us in some respects. However, the right-wing extremist influence on the 
Federal Republic emerging from the USA is also part of this picture. 
I am aware that all these tasks cannot be fulfilled by the state alone. Only 
broad cooperation among all democratic organisations can help to ensure 
that xenophobia disappears and integration works successfully. I agree 
with the Federal Government that opposing xenophobia and working for 
integration cannot be left to politicians alone but requires efforts from all 
citizens. Nevertheless, politicians must support the work o f the citizens. Vural Öger 
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They must initiate, delegate and provide the necessary resources. Above 
all, the government must achieve a strong alliance of all democrats. I am 
certain that many would gladly make themselves available for this purpose 
– including me.  
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Gurbux Singh  
Combating Racism and Promoting  
Integration – The Role of Government  
I want to address three issues: 
-  the basic principles relating to multiculturalism, which are musts in 
the UK; 
-  the role of government in delivering a genuine equalities agenda 
within Britain; 
-  the role of the Equal Opportunities Commission, its responsibilities 
and the critical issues it believes should form the agenda for a real 
discussion. 
Basic principles 
We in Britain believe in integration rather than assimilation. This means 
the co-existence of different cultures; communities with different 
languages; and different faiths. We do not believe in assimilation in the 
sense that people should become brown or black English people. 
A modern state must be based on the principles of multiculturalism, 
diversity and pluralism. 
Cultural, linguistic and colour differences are strengths, rather than 
problems. 
Integration is a two-way process and it can lead to different cultures 
fusing as well as creating fluidity between cultures. 
All citizens are equal, but may be different.  Gurbux Singh 
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I would also like to make one simple point. We do not use the language of 
exclusion. We do not talk about foreigners, immigrants, migrants, guest 
workers, "these people". We believe in a Britain in which all peoples are 
genuinely equal in the eyes of society. Use of language is vitally 
important. If someone called me an immigrant, which I am - I was born in 
Punjab and came to Britain at the age of six - I would be mortified. That 
sort of language is unacceptable. 
The Role of Government 
The government has four basic responsibilities: 
To create and set a vision of modern Britain, based upon the principles of 
inclusion, fairness and justice, where all its citizens have a sense of 
belonging, a stake in the country and are enabled to make a contribution 
to the social and economic well-being of the state. At the heart of that 
vision must be multiculturalism. 
To provide leadership and commitment to that vision. Government should 
be able to deliver the vision across all the institutions of state at national, 
regional and local level. In this way, government creates the environment 
where racism and racial discrimination are unacceptable. 
As an employer and a policy maker. As an employer it has the 
responsibility, enshrined  in law, to ensure that all its institutions reflect 
the composition of Britain's communities. That applies to the whole 
hierarchy of state institutions, not just people at the bottom end of the 
organisation. Linked to that, as policy maker, all government  polices 
should be developed to reflect all the needs of its citizens. These policies 
should not discriminate either directly or indirectly against certain 
sections of its communities. 
To create a legal, anti-discriminatory framework, including the 
establishment of a formal law-enforcement agency. In the UK we set up 
the Commission for Racial Equality as a result of the 1976 Race Relations 
Act.  Combating Racism and Promoting Integration – The Role of Government 
59 
The Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) 
The CRE has three basic responsibilities: 
To aid legally and financially individuals who believe that they have been 
victims of discrimination. To enable them to take their cases to court and 
to employment tribunals. 
To promote good policies and practices and promote change, both within 
the public and private sectors. To ensure that institutions within those two 
sectors genuinely deliver equal opportunities. 
To conduct legally-based formal investigations, where the CRE believes 
discrimination exists. Thus we have just launched two significant 
investigations. One into the Crown Prosecution Service and the other into 
the Prison Service. A law enforcement agency must enforce the law and 
use the powers it has. 
Britain faces a number of key problems in relation to race discrimination:  
There is considerable discrimination in the labour market. Employers 
exclude black, Asian and other minority communities from securing access 
to employment. Black and Asian graduates leaving universities will find it 
three or four times more difficult to find the same job as their white peers. 
Education is a real problem in Britain, with significant underachievement 
by sections of our school population. Afro-Caribbean males have been 
failed by the education system for the last 30 years and leave school 
having done significantly less well than others. This has a serious impact 
on their life chances when they seek employment. That also applies to 
Bangladeshi and Pakistani children now. 
Racial violence is on the increase. Most recent figures in London alone 
show over 63 cases a day. There are 23,000 cases reported and recorded 
by the police annually. 
People from minority communities are underrepresented within politics 
and public life. In the UK's premier democratic institution, the House of 
Commons, there are only 9 people drawn from minorities. In the House of Gurbux Singh 
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Lords there are over 20. In the most recently established democratically-
elected institutions there is a massive failure  - the Scottish Parliament, 
Welsh Assembly and London Assembly have failed to reflect their 
communities adequately. 
Despite these problems, there is at present a very positive environment in 
the UK where we can achieve some substantial change. That particularly 
applies to the new race relations act, which has the potential to lead to 
significant change in the public sector.  
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Pál Csáky 
Ethnic Minorities  
in the Light of European Integration 
I am myself an elected MP representing the community of the Hungarian 
minority in Slovakia, currently executive of the Slovak Government. As an 
elected member of Parliament from as far back as 1990, I  have been 
involved in the solution of multi-ethnic issues in the Slovak Republic, as 
well as in the former Czechoslovakia. I worked in 1991 and 1992 as a 
member of the political group led by Václav Havel, President of the Czech 
and Slovak Federal Republic, seeking a political solution to the crisis that 
occurred in Czechoslovakia at that time. I was also a member of the 
group of legal experts which, headed by Alexander Dubèek, prepared the 
new Constitution of the Federative Republic. To complete this historical 
review, I should also say that my party was in opposition until 1998, as 
our Hungarian Coalition opposed certain actions taken and solutions 
chosen by the Government at the time, but we had been unable to avert 
them for lack of sufficient political power. Allow me to quote a specific 
case in this connection: we were the strongest opposition to the 
government between 1994 and 1998 and disagreed with a policy resulting 
in the isolation of our country - the time which was lost in that period is 
still very regrettable. The adverse approach towards minorities was one of 
the unresolved issues of those years.  
Living at a time which forms the milestone between two millennia, we are 
trying to establish a European architecture for the 21
st century. I am sure 
that the cultural variety of Europe is a precious asset well worth 
maintaining for the future. Clearly, integration must proceed in those 
fields where the global competitiveness of Europe is at stake. These are Pál Csáky 
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primarily the monetary, financial, economic, political and security fields. 
In other fields, those of national identity, culture, language, regional 
traditions, it is their preservation that makes Europe stronger. 
Multiculturalism makes people more open, increases their creativity, and 
amplifies their ability to listen to different impulses. 
We are discussing here today minority rights in individual countries as 
well as in a European context. In the future, the same principles will 
perhaps be applicable to the co-existence of nations in Europe, where 
even the largest nations will  de facto  be in a minority position. We can 
already foresee the necessity for a certain degree of compromise between 
diversity and expediency. A functioning European Parliament 
simultaneously using 20 or 25 languages is difficult to imagine. Bilingual 
or multilingual skills are already a requirement for the citizen of Europe, 
but just because one is able to communicate in some global languages 
does not mean that one should forget his or her own, even if less utilised, 
mother tongue. A reasonable balance should offer a solution to this 
problem as well.  
Indeed, while being a member of a minority and at the same time the 
Deputy Prime Minister responsible for my country's policy towards 
minorities, I consider the present situation a model for the future. Those 
solutions discussed here today may also offer solutions for the future. 
Decentralisation, regionalism, balanced global and regional interests may 
represent those principles most suitably applied for our purposes. In this 
respect,  very many benefits could be provided by funds and institutions 
supporting the research and development of minority cultures and 
languages, both financially and in terms of organisation. Autonomous 
systems, allowing for implementation of the principle of subsidiarity, 
would be v ery helpful. We are trying to apply those principles today in 
Slovakia. There is a legal foundation for these efforts in Article 34 of the 
Slovak Constitution, guaranteeing fundamental rights and liberties in their 
entire range, from political to cultural ones. Unfortunately, we have not 
yet succeeded in enacting an extensive statute providing for 
implementation of those rights; however, partial laws and governmental Ethnic Minorities in the Light of European Integration 
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decrees are, in effect, ensuring the satisfactory exercise of those rights by 
all of the 11 officially recognised minorities. 
I must admit that my present considerations have been concentrating on 
issues of the traditional and indigenous minorities of Europe. We should 
not, however, forget those relating to immigrants and t o the European 
Romany communities which, in my opinion, are in a specific situation 
requiring a special approach. 
In our country this issue mainly concerns the Romany community. This 
complicated problem presents a quest for a comprehensive model of co-
existence between two substantially different cultures, rather than a 
classic minority issue. I am glad to be in a position to declare that a very 
fertile European co-operation is appearing in this field, to a certain 
degree resulting from the activities of the Government of Slovakia. I 
consider it an honour to reconfirm our efforts for the widest possible co-
operation, and to express my belief that our common experience within 
the PHARE programmes and with joint projects, as for instance with the 
British Know  How Fund, represents an excellent beginning of such co-
operation. We currently have a biannual action plan running in Slovakia 
against all forms of intolerance, racial and national prejudice and 
xenophobia. Within this project, we will propose to Parliament an anti-
discrimination law protecting citizens against all forms of intolerance. I 
have sought technical a ssistance from the British Know How Fund 
relating to this issue, and I am hopeful that this draft law, scheduled for 
enactment in the first half of  next year, will represent a very positive 
example of our mutual collaboration. 
Nearing the conclusion of my presentation, I would like to refer to yet 
another sensitive issue, which is the need for unification of the European 
Union asylum policy. To avoid any misunderstanding, I wish to state that 
the right to asylum is considered inviolable not only by myself but also by 
all members of the Slovak Government. However, we are not happy with 
the abuse of that right by certain members of our population groundlessly 
seeking asylum in order to obtain economic advantages. Pál Csáky 
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We are also deeply unhappy that the response to such activities has been 
in the form of the introduction of visa requirements for our citizens. The 
Slovak Republic is a free country, guaranteeing free movement for each 
Slovak citizen. The problem of Romany migration, a phenomenon lasting 
for several centuries, cannot be unilaterally resolved; its successful 
resolution is only possible by consistent international co-ordination. 
By way of conclusion, I should like to emphasise that a positive attitude 
toward minorities brings a calm conscience but it is not enough: it also 
requires a systematic approach, since it is an issue forming the 
foundations of our future common Europe.  
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Elizabeth Meehan 
Ethnic Minorities  
in the Light of European Integration 
Introduction 
Ethnic minorities in the EU may be nationals of member states and, 
hence, citizens of the Union. They may be third country nationals residing 
in the Union but who, not being nationals of a member state, are not 
citizens of the Union. They may be refugees and asylum-seekers. In my 
remarks, I shall concentrate on the situations of the first two categories 
and measures intended to improve them. ‘Migrant’ was among the words 
mentioned by an earlier speaker as having overtones of ‘labelling’ but I 
shall have to use it since it is a regular feature of EU documents.  
The situations of minorities,  
either EU citizens or non-citizens of the Union 
A 1998 survey of five ethnic minority groups in five member states shows 
that most respondents - nationals, dual nationals, or long-term residents - 
believe that they have access to a satisfactory range of rights (1). But 
there are exceptions and substantial proportions of all five ethnic 
minorities have experienced racial threats and abuse. This finding was 
strongest in Germany, the UK, Belgium and France and lowest in the 
Netherlands. Such racism was reported as more likely to be displayed by 
fellow citizens than by institutions, except the police and courts w here Elizabeth Meehan 
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institutionalized racism, referred to earlier by Trevor Phillips, is most 
experienced. 
Since the Schengen Agreement, ethnic minority nationals of member states 
have experienced discriminatory treatment at borders because officials 
assume that they must be third country nationals with unlawful intentions. 
In general, the flanking measures for external frontiers enabling control-
free internal borders to exist are said to ‘securitize’ the issue of 
immigration and, in so doing, to reinforce a sense that minorities, 
whatever their national status, are undesirable.(2).  
From the 1980s until the mid-1990s, there were attempts to bring about 
EU-wide anti-discrimination standards for both national minorities and 
nationals of third countries residing in the EU (3). These attempts were 
either disputed, consultative or declaratory and non-binding. In 1995, The 
European Migrants’ Forum submitted proposals for consideration by the 
1996 Intergovernmental Conference that third country nationals be 
protected under what was to become the Amsterdam Treaty. 
New Provisions Relevant to Minorities 
The Amsterdam provisions which are most relevant to minorities include: 
(a) An expanded and more forceful restatement of the general principles 
underlying the EU. This includes respect for human rights, as well as 
liberty and democracy. The Treaty also confirms that the EU as a whole 
respects the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 1961 European Social Charter 
and the 1989 Community Charter. 
(b) A new Article 13 which provides, for the first time, a legal basis for 
action, going beyond employment, to be taken to combat discrimination 
based on racial or ethnic origin and religion or belief, as well as sex, 
disability, age or sexual orientation. 
(c) The transfer to the Community Pillar, from the inter-governmental 
Schengen Agreement and Justice and Home Affairs Pillar, matters Ethnic Minorities in the Light of European Integration 
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relating to the crossing of external frontiers and internal borders. A New 
Article 63(3) and (4) allows for:  
(i) the development of common minimum standards in matters relating  
to asylum, refugees and short-term visas for third country nationals  
crossing an external frontier into one member state or another;  
(ii) freedom for them to travel within the territory of the EU as a whole  
within a period of three months;  
(iii) conditions of entry and residence and procedures for the issue of  
long-term visas and residence permits, including those for the purpose  
of family reunion; and 
(iv) measures defining the rights and conditions under which third  
country nationals lawfully resident in a member state may reside in  
another member state.  
Just before the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty on 1 May, 1999, 
the Expert Group on Fundamental Rights reported in February. It noted a 
prior proposal by the Commission that Regulation 1408/71 on social 
security be extended to third country migrants and proposed that all future 
consideration in the EU of fundamental rights must address non-citizens 
of the EU (4).  
Human rights in general and the particular question of justice for third 
country migrants having been brought into the sphere of common policy-
making, the subsequent Cologne and Tampere summits of June and 
October 1999 acknowledged the need for concrete measures. At Cologne, 
it was noted that the proposed Charter of Rights could not be wholly 
exclusive to Union citizens. At Tampere, it was accepted that there was a 
need to harmonize national legislation on admission and residence and to 
bring about fair treatment f or lawfully resident third country nationals. 
This was defined as offering them rights and obligations comparable to 
those of Union citizens.  Elizabeth Meehan 
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(i) The main actions initiated so far relating to freedom of movement 
These are: 
(a) Still on the table is the 1997 proposal to amend Regulation 1408/71 on 
social security to extend its coverage from intra-community migrants to 
nationals of third countries. This was communicated to the Council in 
January 1998. Social security is referred to in a proposed, as yet 
unagreed, Directive on the right of family reunification. I shall say more 
about this in a minute. Let me just note here its proposal that member 
states may still require evidence of sickness insurance covering all risks so 
that the incoming family will ‘not become a burden on the host state’. But 
the D irective also states that there must be no discrimination between 
nationals of member states and third country nationals in the application 
of social security regulations. 
(b) In addition, there is a related proposal, dating from 1998, similarly to 
amend Regulation 1612/68 on assistance for migrant families to integrate 
into host countries. Again, the proposed Directive on family reunification 
states that, following Tampere, all family members must enjoy access to 
primary and secondary schooling, vocational training and university 
education (5). These are amongst the services covered for intra-
Community migrants in either in Regulation 1612/68 or jurisprudence 
arising from it.  
(c) And there is the aforementioned 1999 Proposal for a Council Directive 
on the right to family reunification. This was communicated to the Council 
in December 1999 [COM (1999) 638 final 1999/0258 (CNS)]. It aims to 
give effective protection for the family life of lawfully resident third 
country nationals, with a residence permit of at least one year, who have 
left their families behind (6). Third country migrants who wish to form a 
family by bringing in a spouse will still fall within the purview of member 
state legislation. But the Directive, if agreed in its present form, would 
apply to persons enjoying subsidiary protection for humanitarian reasons 
and to refugees regardless of the length of their permit. But it will not Ethnic Minorities in the Light of European Integration 
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apply to asylum-seekers ‘since the outcome of their applications cannot be 
predicted in advance’.  
The definition of family covers descending and ascending lines of 
dependants, equalizing the situations of intra-Community and third 
country migrants. Unmarried partners are regulated by existing standards 
of equal treatment with member state cohabitees and evidence of stability 
in the relationship. Reunification for polygamous families is ruled out but 
public authorities are to be sympathetic to a second spouse, on for 
example the death of the first, when it is in the interests of children.  
This Directive has not yet been agreed because of opposition to its to 
inclusion of refugees and because of disputes about its definition of 
family. 
(ii) Actions to combat discrimination which are relevant to minorities who 
are Union citizens and/or those who are not. 
These include the two Directives, based on Article 13, discussed earlier 
by Baroness Scotland. These Directives do not cover discrimination based 
on nationality (as do the proposed measures on freedom of movement) but 
they do apply to migrants from third countries, as well as minorities who 
are citizens of the Union, if they have been subjected to discrimination 
based on race or ethnic origin. They are: 
(a) A Council Directive 2000/43/EC to implement the principle of equal 
treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. This 
covers employment and goes beyond it into vocational training, education, 
social protection, social advantages, and access to goods, facilities and 
services. 
(b) A Council Directive establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation race or ethnic origin, religion or 
belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (7). 
These two Directives are accompanied another measure. This is: 
(c) A 1999 Proposal for a Council Decision to establish a Community 
Action Programme, 2001-2006, to combat discrimination based on race Elizabeth Meehan 
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or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation 
[COM (1999) 567 Final 1999/0251 (CNS)] (8). Its particular aim is the 
transnational dissemination of good practice; for example, in access to 
goods and services, participation in decision-making, methods of 
mainstreaming and monitoring, the promotion of non-discrimination in the 
administration of justice, health and social services and the media.  
The Programme will co-ordinate its work on racial and ethnic 
discrimination with relevant initiatives on migration arising from Justice 
and Home Affairs (nationality-based discrimination and non-EU citizens) 
and will make use of research  by the European Monitoring Centre on 
Racism and Xenophobia the work of which we are about to hear. The 
Programme will also be open to participation by candidate member states 
to support their ability to meet the entry criteria on democracy and human 
rights and to introduce the two Directives just mentioned. 
Conclusion 
In 1995, the European Migrants’ Forum pointed out that, since EU 
citizenship does not replace nationality of a member state and, hence, 
coexists with a variety of nationalities, it is difficult to see the logic of not 
granting EU citizenship rights to nationals of third countries. The Forum 
proposed doing so to those who have been resident in the EU for five 
years - the normal period required in member states before naturalization 
or the granting of permanent residence. The idea that, in a régime based 
on a transnational market, place or residence are more rational activators 
of rights has also developed among people such as myself and my 
colleague Antje Wiener (9), who started our analyses by focusing on EU, 
not non-EU, nationals. We both argue that an incipient acknowledgement 
of this is giving rise to a new paradigm of citizenship - pushing against 
what is, after all, a rather recent overlap in the meanings of nationality 
and citizenship. More generally, there is a growing renewal of intellectual 
interest in the old Stoic theory of cosmopolitan citizenship. Carlos Closa 
(10), while talking about a continent rather than a cosmopolis, argues Ethnic Minorities in the Light of European Integration 
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that supranational citizenship is more capable than national citizenship of 
being democratic and inclusive. This is because it cannot be based on 
interpersonal bonds formed under pre-democratic conditions and, hence, 
must be based on universal human rights norms. His reasons for thinking 
that the EU is not yet ready for a limited form of cosmopolitan citizenship 
would take me beyond our subject. Suffice it to say that he sees EU, for 
the time being, as a sphere for the exercise of private rights relating to 
market a ctivity. Even so, if this albeit limited conception of rights were 
extended to third country nationals, it would go some way to meeting the 
aspirations of the European Migrants’ Forum.  
 
 
Footnotes 
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Migrants and their Views’. London: Citizenship and Public Policy Group, Middlesex 
University. 
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the interaction of gender and race and the fact that race discrimination is often 
experienced differently between men and women. The Directive was agreed with 
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Peter Fleissner 
Ethnic Minorities  
in the Light of European Integration 
Today we are confronted in Europe with certain demographic and 
economic problems, and the issue of immigration continuously is on our 
agenda. 
A recent study of the United Nations ends up with the conclusion that the 
European population would have reached a maximum by the year 2000 
and would continuously decline in the five following decades, at an 
increasing rate. From currently 730 million people all Europe would have 
lost 100 millions by 2050, despite a rise in fertility (the total fertility rate 
would have increased from 1.42 in 1995-2000 to 1.77 in 2045-2050), a 
prolonged life expectancy at birth (from 73.3 to 80.1 years) and some 
immigration. Ageing would be the other major feature, with a decline in 
the proportion of children below 15 (from 17.6% in 2000 to 14.4% in 
2050) and a rise in the proportion of elderly people aged 65 or more will 
double from 14.7% to 27.6% (!). At the moment, one 10 persons of 
working age have to finance the pensions of about 2 persons, in fifty years 
from now one can expect 10 persons of working age have to take care of 
nearly 5 retired persons.   Although those figures   just represent averages, it 
is evident that under the assumption that pension systems in Europe will 
not change dramatically, it will become increasingly difficult to finance 
them in the future.  
In addition to the decrease in population, Europe is facing a situation 
where in some sectors of the economy there will be (and in some regions 
already is) considerable shortage of labour – paralleled by high regional 
unemployment rates. For the moment, this is reflected by nation wide Peter Fleissner 
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campaigns in some Member States of the European Union to attract 
qualified labour from countries outside of the European Union, from Far 
East or from the Enlargement Candidates, in particular in the field of 
computer science, electronics and biotechnologies, and genetic 
engineering. However, this is just the beginning of an increase in demand 
for more people even in other branches of the economy. The European 
work force is ageing, and it becomes increasingly difficult to find enough 
specialists and qualified labour for having them started in the new jobs of 
the knowledge based society on the one hand and to replace the retired 
people on the  other. The fear of Europeans expecting large waves of 
immigrants flooding into the European Union Member States should be 
counteracted by the acknowledgement of the fact that there is an 
increasing necessity to have more immigrants doing necessary jobs in the 
European industries. 
Consequently, for the coming decades this may mean for the Europeans 
that they have to face even more interaction at the workplaces and in their 
neighbourhoods with people of other ethnicities, religions and cultures. 
By no means, we should view this development as a negative one. It 
represents a challenge for politicians and for the citizen. Under the 
appropriate political and economic framework conditions, examples in 
history show the possibility of an increase of cultural wealth, and the 
advent of periods of economic and social well-being, combined with 
accelerated progress in arts and sciences. 
Nevertheless, preventive measures to counteract latent or open racist and 
xenophobic tendencies have to be considered also.  
Let us have a short glance at the actual situation. The following empirical 
results we have found by means of a Eurobarometer survey in May of this 
year. They are based on 17000 interviews in the European Union Member 
States.  
On the average four fifth of the EU citizens do not find ‘different’ people 
disturbing. “Different” here means different “by nationality”, “by race”, 
and “by religion”. However, since 1997 there is a slight increase of those Ethnic Minorities in the Light of European Integration 
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who find different people disturbing: 2.2% in terms of nationality, 0.8% 
in terms of race and 1.2 % in terms of religion.  
If we break the results down by country, there is evidence for rather big 
differences between the various countries. Peter Fleissner 
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While only 6% of the Spanish population sample told the interviewers to 
be disturbed by people of another religion, it is interesting to note that 
nearly one third of the Danish population sample is disturbed (see table 
above). When the Danish people are asked about disturbance by another 
race the level of disturbance is much lower than in the case of religion. 
Only one quarter of the persons interviewed felt disturbed (see table 
below).  Ethnic Minorities in the Light of European Integration 
77 
If it comes to the attitudes of the EU citizen towards people of the Eastern 
Countries, one can see a rather big variety of acceptance. I think we have 
to be aware that there is some reluctance to welcome the new citizens in 
an enlarged Europe (see table below). Peter Fleissner 
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The Governments of the Member States of the EU and the European 
Union itself are already prepared and dedicated to fight against racism 
and xenophobia. As we can see on the level of the European Council and 
the European Parliament, legal means are already undertaken to fight 
against discrimination on the basis of race, religion or culture. The 
European Council has adopted a sound package against Racism:  
In June the so called “Race Directive” passed the Council, (Directive 
2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000). This new Directive provides a tool against 
discrimination on grounds of racial and ethnic origin and challenges the 
Member States to go beyond those minimum requirements. 
Recently, in October 2000, political agreement could be gained on a 
Directive against discrimination on the Workplace,  
and on an Action Plan to fight many kinds of discrimination in the 
European Union. 
Probably at the Nizza Summit the latter two will come into legal force 
also. Within three years time the member states should implement these 
Directives into their national legislations. 
 
Activities of the EUMC 
We at the European Monitoring Centre are assisting these activities on 
various levels: 
The EUMC is a tool, which provides the Governments and the European 
Union with facts and experience, which will contribute to make this fight 
successful. 
We hope to make it more difficult for extremist tendencies and forces to 
rely on false information and evil prejudice.  
We will assist in making it difficult to promote a policy, which does not 
take into account good practices, which have shown positive results in our 
countries. Ethnic Minorities in the Light of European Integration 
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By offering reliable information we will  make it easier for those 
governments, which sincerely want to eradicate the stigmatization of 
ethnic groups. 
We will make it more cumbersome for those groups or parties, who for 
their own political profit wish to stimulate the strongest feelings amongst 
human beings: fear and hatred  – based upon lies and hate-speech and 
who promise solutions, which sacrifice our moral allegations. 
Let me give you a short review what the EUMC is doing to meet these 
goal and how we try to fulfil this role in practice: 
All our activities base on the Council Regulation 1035/97 that established 
the EUMC. It sets out the prime objective, which is to: 
“Provide the Community and its Member States with objective, reliable 
and comparable data at the European level on the phenomena of racism, 
xenophobia and anti-Semitism in order to help them take measures or 
formulate courses of action within their respective spheres of 
competence.” 
 
The EUMC is also required to: 
“Study the extent and development of the phenomena and manifestations 
of  racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism, analyse their causes, 
consequences and effects, and examine examples of good practice in 
dealing with them.” 
 
A Networking Organisation 
In order to meet the objectives given by the Directive the EUMC had to 
find an adequate organisational structure. Being a small organisation on 
the European Union level, the EUMC can be most efficient by becoming a 
networking organisation. We are in fact concentrating our efforts on 
establishing new and co-operating with already existing networks active in 
combating racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism, and to strengthen them 
in handling knowledge and experience available.  Peter Fleissner 
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Through networks, the EUMC is able to identify negative developments 
(early warning system) and positive approaches operating within each 
Member State of the European Union. This enables the EUMC to bring 
together the different networks in order to establish a “think tank” for 
analysis and new initiatives. The most important networking activities are: 
RAXEN, a European Information Network set up by the EUMC,  
Assisting national and organising European-wide round tables, and 
co-operation with other networks on global and European level, like  
ECRI, the European Commission against Racism, founded by the Council 
of Europe, and  
ENAR, a European Network of NGO’s, supported by DG Employment and 
Social Affairs. 
 
RAXEN 
One of the major goals given to us is to establish a European Information 
Network on Racism and Xenophobia (RAXEN). RAXEN consists of three 
integrated activities: 
Establishing National Focal Points  
Linking them to the EUMC on a high level data security and privacy 
Complementing the Focal Points with RAREN, a global expert network  
After a public Call for tender published in the Official Journal of the EU 
the EUMC is in the position to contract National Focal Points in seven 
countries, who will be the entrance point at national level for EUMC as 
regards data and information collection. The British focal point is the 
well-known Commission for Racial Equality; the German one is the RAA 
Berlin, (Regionale Arbeitsstellen für Ausländerfragen, Jugendarbeit und 
Schule). The National Focal Points will be the key players in the RAXEN 
network for the collection and collation of information, data and 
statistics, and the initiation of research in the broad field of racism at the 
local, regional and national level in the Member States. Their first task is Ethnic Minorities in the Light of European Integration 
81 
to perform the so-called “mapping exercise”. This exercise should help to 
find out on a national level “what is known where and by whom”.  
Early in 2001 a second Call for tender will be published to establish the 
missing National Focal Points and to start regular monitoring activities 
with all the fifteen Member States. Details of the Call for tender may be 
downloaded from the EUMC homepage http://eumc.eu.int/.  
 
IDA (Intergovernmental Data Acces) 
In September 2000 the EUMC published a Call for Tender on two studies 
for the design and planning of the electronic and data security aspects of 
the RAXEN Network. DG Enterprise of the European Commission is 
assisting the EUMC with the financial means and organizational for the 
physical implementation of a high security network with encryption, 
identification and authentication procedures of the users. The reports will 
be available in the first half of 2001.  
 
RAREN 
The Rapid Response and Evaluation Network (RAREN) enables the EUMC 
to establish world-wide links with experts and researchers in the fields of 
racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and intercultural issues on a 
contractual basis. The members of the network react at short notice to 
requests made by the EUMC via e -mail. RAREN is charged with three 
tasks: 
To provide expertise, information and data in the fields of racism, 
xenophobia, anti-Semitism and intercultural issues 
To react to specific requests from institutions of the European Union or 
the Member States  
To assess and improve the quality of written output of the EUMC 
The first task will take place in the first half of 2001. Thereafter the 
additional National Focal Points already established at that time will take Peter Fleissner 
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over responsibility. The second task will require rapid responses to 
requests at short notice normally within a few days. Task three will be a 
permanent task for RAREN.  
Contracts were  sent out last week to 16 experts and their deputies. 
(German member: Ms Dimitria Clayton). The contracts will end by May 
2001. A new Call for tender will be published immediately after this 
expiring date. 
 
Round Tables  
The EUMC, in particular the members  of the Management Board, are 
involved in initiating Round Tables in the Member States. National Round 
Tables should convene at least once each year. EUMC facilitates and 
encourages the regular holdings of Round Tables with the participation of 
social partners, research centres and representatives of responsible public 
authorities, as well as, persons and NGO’s concerned with the struggle 
against the phenomena of racism and xenophobia.  
The mission and modalities of National Round Tables are 
To engage the representatives of civil society and the public authorities in 
a dialogue and to make them work together;  
To collect national information coming from different sources on the 
nature of racism as well as on the means to fight it;  
To undertake studies and to make proposals; and  
To communicate their work to the EUMC, especially the RAXEN network  
In 2000 to date, France, Denmark, Germany, Austria and Portugal have 
held national Round Tables, or equivalent meetings. The second German 
Round Table was held in October and the fourth UK Round Table met this 
months. The third Irish Round Table is scheduled to take place before the 
end of the year. 
In June this year the EUMC has invited the National Coordinators to 
Vienna for the first European Round Table Conference. The Conference Ethnic Minorities in the Light of European Integration 
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offers a platform to discuss projects of mutual interest, and to exchange 
'good practices'. This year proposals in the field of education were 
presented and discussed.  
 
Co-operation with EU Institutions and other International Organisations 
To improve co-ordination and increase the focus of the struggle against 
racist phenomena, the EUMC is further developing its relations with the 
EU institutions, in particular the European Parliament, the Council of 
Ministers and the European Commission. The aim is to seek ways to 
strengthen and build on the European Union’s initiatives in the areas of 
racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism. A draft Memorandum for Co-
operation between the European Commission and the EUMC is currently 
discussed.  
The EUMC held meetings with ECRI, the European Commission contra 
Racism and Intolerance, of the Council of Europe, and also with ENAR, 
the European Network against Racism, a network consisting of non 
governmental organisations, to discuss mutual co-operation. EUMC staff 
has actively participated in international conferences including the EU 
Human Rights Conference in Venice, the International Consultation on 
Roma Refugees and Asylum Seekers, Warsaw, and the European 
Preparatory Conference on Human Rights in Strasbourg. 
 
Other activities 
As you could already see, networking in various areas is our main 
instrument to co-operate with other institutions of the European Union. 
However, although networking is necessary, it is not sufficient for the 
success of the fight against racism. Networking has to be complemented 
by a good understanding of what is going on in the realm of research on 
racism and xenophobia and in good practice to fight these phenomena. 
For this reason, the EUMC initiated also a series of studies. Here is not Peter Fleissner 
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the place to give a complete list of these activities, but let me mention only 
a few examples: 
As part of the exercise to establish RAXEN, the EUMC needs to collect 
comparable and reliable data and statistics from Member States. To 
support the future work of the National Focal Points a pilot project ‘Data 
on racial crime and offences’ was launched earlier this year to collect 
data on racial crime and offences in Member States. Its goal is to present 
a statistical overview of crimes and offences against  citizens on racial, 
ethnic or religious grounds in the Member States, specifying types of 
crimes, victims and perpetrators, defining criminal behaviour, during the 
period 1995 to 2000 
As special study on the attitudes of the citizens in the European Member 
States on immigrants and minorities is in progress. The EUMC has added 
a set of specific questions to the  Eurobarometer survey of the European 
Commission done in May this year.  
Socio-economic data on ethnic minorities and migrants: A study to present 
a s tatistical overview of official data in the Member States regarding the 
living conditions of the population as a whole and differentiated for ethnic 
minorities and immigrants, in the areas of labour, housing, education and 
health, during the period 1995 to 2000 has been outsourced and is 
underway.  
Cultural diversity and mainstreaming: In order to promote cultural 
diversity in a positive way in the fight against racism and xenophobia the 
EUMC is evaluating mainstreaming and good practice to support cultural 
diversity in Europe.  
Racism and cultural diversity in the mass media: The EUMC developed a 
project to present an overview of mass media studies in Member States, 
regarding the way racism, anti-racism and multiculturalism have been 
covered, and the way the mass media has worked to promote cultural 
diversity and integration during the period 1995 to 2000. All the studies 
mentioned before will be ready in the beginning of 2001. Ethnic Minorities in the Light of European Integration 
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Recently the EUMC has completed a joint study on the Community’s 
legislative initiatives taken under Article 13 of the EU Treaty. As part of 
this project we have received 15 national reports on national legislative 
measures to combat racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia in the 15 
Member States, and a study to compare them.  
Monitoring  the Implementation of the  Charter of Political Parties for a 
non-racist Society: The Charter has been signed by a number of political 
parties in Europe. The work to be done is to establish a monitoring system 
in order to verify implementation and to measure the impact and efficiency 
of the Charter.  
Not all of the studies mentioned are already available. They are still in 
progress. But I can present also one piece of work we have published 
quite recently. I proudly can announce the Annual Report 1999, which we 
published last week at the occasion of a press conference in the European 
Parliament in Brussels. While the full report is available in three 
languages, the summary can be read in all the eleven languages of the 
European Union. In a few days you may also download the full text 
version from our website http://eumc.eu.int. 
At the end of my presentation and would like to come back to my basic 
message. I think that there is hope for the establishment of a multi-faceted 
society, enriched by diversity. There is hope for conviviality in peace. Let 
us co-operate in finding the pathways for a non-violent future, by bringing 
together all our efforts.  
 Peter Fleissner 
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European Demography. Desparately?; see http://www.un.org/esa/population/festy.pdf  
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Returning to the Foreign Office, he was successively Head of United 
Nations Department, Defence Department and Security Policy 
Department. From 1990-92 Sir Paul was Ambassador and Head of the 
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State in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (1992-94), Deputy 
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Committee (1994-96) and Deputy Under Secretary of State and Economic 
Director in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (1996-97).  
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Manchester University. Since 1991 Professor of Politics, The Queen’s 
University of Belfast. Since 1992 Jean Monnet Professor of European 
Social Policy. 1994-99 Commissioner, Fair Employment Commission, 
Belfast. 1995-97 Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Social Science. 
Since 1996 Deputy Chair, Social Science Research Council, Republic of 
Ireland. 1998-99 Visiting Research Fellow, The Policy Institute, and 
visitor, Political Science Department, Trinity College Dublin. Since 1999 
Founding Academician, Academy of Social Sciences. Since 2000 Member,  
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and British-Irish Relations: Northern Ireland; new relations in the context 
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and VISTA chains (a total of 9,000 beds), the ÖGER group has one of the 
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Trevor Phillips is a broadcaster and journalist and chair of the Greater 
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Gurbux speaks Punjabi, Hindi and Urdu. He lives in North London with 
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Parliamentary State Secretary, Interior Ministry 
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Caritas Association (Catholic welfare organisation). 1974  – 1988 
Chairman of the Caritas Association for the Münster diocese. During this 
period also chairman of the federal association of Catholic facilities for 
assisting the homeless. 1981 Chairman of the Catholic  Hospitals 
Federation Germany. 1988 Ordination as Titular Bishop of Thisiduo and 
Suffragen Bishop of Münster, Regional Bishop for Coesfeld-
Recklinghausen. Appointed C anon. Member of Commission VI of the 
German Bishops’ Conference for “social and charitable  issues”. 1992  – 
1996 Chairman of Commission XIII – Caritas – of the German Bishops’ 
Conference. 1997 Chairman of Commission XIV  – migration  - of the 
German Bishops’ Conference. Member of the working group “social  
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affairs” of the COMECE – Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of the 
European Community. Member of the Papal Council “Spiritual Counsel 
for people on the move”. Continued membership of Commissions XIII and 
VI. 1998 Member of the Papal Council for pastoral care of the sick and 
health assistance. 
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